BEAUMONT – The 9th District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a ruling in an attorney's fee case.
Justice Leanne Johnson found some favor with attorney Efrem Sewell, who filed suit against his former client Joseph Guillory II and Appellee Zurich American Insurance Co. for allegedly not paying his contingency fees in a personal injury claim by accepting one appeal on two separate summary judgments in a Dec. 21, 2017, opinion.
According to the opinion, Guillory hired Sewell in 2012 to represent him in a personal injury lawsuit he filed after being in a motorcycle accident with driver Darius Clifton, who was riding a vehicle owned or operated by Diakon Logistics Inc. The fee agreement included a Sewell receiving 33 1/3 percent payout of all personal injury protection funds received prior to the suit filing and 40 percent if a settlement was made after the filing.
However in 2013, Guillory informed Sewell that he no longer wanted his representation since he hired a new attorney, the opinion states. Guillory then hired attorney Clay Dugas to represent him in a lawsuit against Clifton and Diakon. In 2015 when Sewell found out Guillory had settled, he demanded full attorney interest; however, Dugas sought a declaratory judgment stating that Sewell was not entitled to any part of the settlement.
Sewell then filed his own lawsuit against Guillory and Zurich arguing the parities respectively breached the fee and assignment agreement. After several back-and-forth summary judgement motions by both parties against the other, the trial court combined all of the motions in one hearing and granted Zurich’s motion for summary judgment and Guillory’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment separately.
Citing several precedent cases including Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., v. Knott, Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett and Merriman v. XTO Energy Inc. 2013, Johnson detailed the standard of review.
“In our review, we deem as true all evidence that is favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor,” according to the appeal. “When the trial court does not specify the basis for its ruling, we must affirm a summary judgment if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious.”
Continuing to explain both appellees traditional and no-evidence summary judgment requests, Johnson detailed Sewell’s right to attorney fees based on Texas law, which “if an attorney hired on a contingent-fee basis is discharged without cause before the representation is completed, the attorney may seek compensation from his client under either the contract or in quantum meruit,” according to the appeal, further noting such remedies are called Mandell remedies.
“The Mandell remedies are strictly construed, and the Texas Supreme Court looks unfavorably upon contingent fee contracts that purport to contract around them,” according to the appeal.
As for Zurich’s motion for summary judgment, Johnson detailed how Zurich is not responsible for any reimbursement.
“Sewell’s quantum meruit claim is an extra-contractual claim and that claim is not cognizable against Zurich given that the services rendered by Sewell, if any, were for Guillory’s benefit, and not for the benefit of Zurich,” according to the appeal.
Johnson then reversed and remanded Sewell’s claim against Guillory and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Zurich.