BEAUMONT – The Court of Appeals for the 9th District of Texas at Beaumont panel of judges has reversed an 88th District Court’s decision in a case fileld by a Texas inmate injured in prison.
Chief Justice Charles Kreger and Judges Steve McKeithen and Hollis Horton ruled in favor of appellant Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s (TDCJ) plea of subject-matter jurisdiction brought against it by Neftali Cisneros due no formal and timely notice provided to TDCJ in a March 1 opinion.
"Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying TDCJ's plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing appellee Neftali Cisneros’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction," the court stated.
After severing his hand and fingers on a woodworking saw while cleaning it while incarcerated at the TCDJ Gib Lewis Unit, Cisneros sued TDCJ for alleged negligence, arguing the accident was caused by another inmate’s negligence.
However, TDCJ countered the claim, arguing Cisneros never gave a formal and timely notice of complaint, which under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) offers sovereign immunity government agencies that have been charged with action, according to the opinion authored by judge Kreger.
Beginning the standard of review, citing Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. McQueen 2014, Kreger points out that “if a governmental unit has immunity from a pending claim, a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction as to that claim,” and since “the trial court ruled on TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction, we are compelled to review such ruling from the record before the trial court at the time of its ruling.”
Addressing the TTCA notice requirements, Kreger cites See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia 2010 to point out that “absent a waiver, governmental entities, like TDCJ, are generally immune from suits for damages,” but “to take advantage of this waiver and overcome the shield of governmental immunity, a claimant must notify a governmental unit of the negligent act not later than six months after the incident.”
After detailing both formal and actual notice prerequisites, Kreger stated Cisneros undoubtedly failed to meet the six-month requirement.
Citing Cathey v. Booth 1995, the judge pointed out “if a governmental unit is not subjectively aware of its fault, it does not have the same incentive to gather information that the statute is designed to provide, even when it would not be unreasonable to believe that the governmental unit was at fault.”
Though Cisneros argues that the administrative incident and serious incident report should be considered as notice, he failed to realize his argument would be held against him in the report details that define the inmate’s negligent behavior and not TDCJ, the court stated.
“Under these circumstances, we determine that TDCJ conclusively proved, as a matter of law, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because TDCJ was not shown to have subjective awareness of its fault, as alleged by Cisneros, in producing or contributing to Cisneros’s injuries, or otherwise have sufficient notice pursuant to the Tort Claims Act,” Kreger concluded.