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Ex-Methodist Hospital employees’ class action over COVID vax loses federal counts, and is remanded to state court

SOUTHEAST TEXAS RECORD

Saturday, December 21, 2024

Ex-Methodist Hospital employees’ class action over COVID vax loses federal counts, and is remanded to state court

Federal Court
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Hanks | US Courts

HOUSTON – A federal judge has dismissed all federal claims and remanded state-law claims to their court of origin, in a class action suit brought by over 100 plaintiffs against Methodist Hospital due to the institution terminating them for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine and thus violating mandatory inoculation policies.

On Sept. 30, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas Judge George C. Hanks Jr. opted to dismiss such federal claims brought by lead plaintiff Jennifer Bridges and 112 other individuals versus Methodist Hospital and 33 other individuals and associated entities, including the Texas Workforce Commission, Texas Health & Human Services Commission and Texas Medical Board.

“In April of 2021, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Methodist implemented a mandatory COVID-19 immunization policy for all of its employees and vendors. Plaintiffs refused to comply with the immunization policy and were let go or had their vendor privileges terminated. Plaintiffs have now sued Methodist and the Government defendants under Section 1983 and various state-law causes of action. They ground their Section 1983 claims in their contention that ‘an individual has the federally secured right to refuse the administration of an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) drug (e.g., Pfizer BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine), biologic or device without incurring a penalty or losing a benefit to which they are otherwise entitled,” Hanks said.

“By ‘Emergency Use Authorization drug’ or ‘EUA drug,’ plaintiffs mean a drug that has been introduced into interstate commerce under the authority of the ‘emergency use’ provisions of 21 U.S.C. Section 360bbb-3. U.S.C. Section 360bbb-3 allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize ‘an emergency use of a product’ that is ‘intended for use in an actual or potential emergency’ but ‘is not approved, licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution…’ The emergency-use provisions may be, and in the case of the COVID pandemic were, invoked on the basis of a determination by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that there is a public health emergency involving a disease that may be attributable to a biological agent. Plaintiffs argue that there is a constitutionally-relevant distinction between mandatory use of a ‘licensed vaccine’ and mandatory use of an ‘EUA drug’ like the COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiffs originally filed this lawsuit in Texas state court, and Methodist removed it to this Court under the federal-question jurisdiction statute. Plaintiffs have amended their pleading three times in this Court.”

According to Hanks, even if the informed-consent provisions of 21 U.S.C. Section 360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II) create a privately enforceable right, plaintiffs’ allegations “fall outside of its scope.”

“The informed-consent provisions ‘address the interaction between the medical provider and the person receiving the vaccine, not the interaction between an employer and an employee receiving a vaccine. Plaintiffs do not allege that any defendant directly administered the vaccine to them, so their claims against defendants fall outside of the reach of the informed-consent provisions of 21 U.S.C. Section 360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II) – even assuming, again, that plaintiffs could root a Section 1983 action in the informed-consent provisions in the first place,” Hanks said.

Nor, according to Hanks, did any of the plaintiffs’ other federal law-based claims sound in substance.

“Plaintiffs also contend that their rights under the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause were violated. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim under this theory. Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege any facts rebutting the presumption that their employment was at-will or showing that their at-will relationship with Methodist was altered. Accordingly, they were not entitled to procedural due process in connection with their terminations,” Hanks stated.

“Plaintiffs next contend that their rights under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause were violated. Substantive due process, unlike procedural due process, ‘bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a substantive-due-process claim. Plaintiffs do not have a fundamental right to refuse vaccination. Accordingly, plaintiffs have to satisfy the rational-basis standard. Their allegations fail to do so. Methodist implemented a mandatory COVID-19 immunization policy in an effort ‘to do their business of saving lives’ without spreading the COVID-19 virus and ‘to keep staff, patients and their families safer.’ Those are legitimate interests, and the immunization policy is rationally related to them. Plaintiffs have not stated a cognizable substantive-due-process claim.”

Hanks added the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim also failed for lack of substantiation and finally, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims brought under the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code – instead, opting to remand them the 284th District Court of Montgomery County.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas case 4:23-cv-01699

284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas case 23-00004-05209

From the Southeast Texas Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com

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