HOUSTON – A federal judge has dismissed without prejudice litigation brought by the mother of a minor child who was sexually assaulted on an Aldine Independent School District school bus for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted – but provided the plaintiff with a chance to re-file the case.
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas Judge Keith P. Ellison issued such a memorandum opinion on July 31, in LaToya Monroe’s litigation (brought on behalf of her minor child, Z.S.) against Aldine Independent School District.
“At all relevant times, plaintiff LaToya Monroe’s six-year-old minor child, Z.S., was enrolled as a student at Aldine ISD. On Feb. 1, 2023, Z.S. returned home without his backpack, and Monroe contacted the school to ask about his missing items. After this inquiry, a police officer contacted Monroe and showed her a video of Z.S. being sexually assaulted by an older student – estimated to be about 12 or 13 years old – while traveling on an Aldine ISD school bus. Monroe then learned that the same student had been assaulting Z.S. on the school bus for several weeks. The older student attended a different school than Z.S., but Aldine ISD had decided to bus students of different schools and ages on the same buses, without a bus monitor,” Ellison stated.
“About a week after the incidents occurred, Monroe noticed the presence of blood after Z.S. used the restroom. She immediately took her son to the hospital. Monroe’s complaint alleges that ‘The distressing sexual assaults suffered by Z.S. during his time on the school bus have left an indelible mark on his emotional, physical, and psychological well-being.’ Following Z.S.’s assault, Monroe and other community advocates called for Aldine ISD to introduce bus aides on all school buses. Monroe also demanded (1) a daily review of camera footage, (2) counseling sessions for Z.S. and his family, (3) the dismissal of supervisors at the Aldine ISD Transportation Center and (4) the filing of charges against the bus driver. Aldine ISD confirmed that the police had begun an investigation and assured Monroe that appropriate actions would be taken.”
Monroe then filed suit in state court (the 215th District Court of Harris County, Texas), bringing the following claims individually and on behalf of Z.S.: (1) Gross negligence; (2) Title IX; (3) 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and the ‘state-created danger’ doctrine. For these claims, Monroe seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
On Jan. 1, defendant removed the action to this Court. The defendants later filed a motion to dismiss on March 22 pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asking the Court to dismiss all of Monroe’s claims against them.
Ellison specified that Aldine ISD was immune from liability unless that immunity has been waived by the Texas Tort Claims Act. As relevant here, the Act provides that a governmental unit in the state is liable for:
• (1) Property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if: (A) The property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and (B) The employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law; and
• (2) Personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
Ellison found that Aldine ISD was indeed entitled to governmental immunity against Monroe’s gross negligence claims.
“Thus, the issue here is whether Z.S.’s injuries ‘arise from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.’ Plaintiff submits that they do, given that Z.S. was assaulted while riding on an Aldine ISD school bus. But, as defendants point out, it is well-established that the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity where the vehicle merely provides the site of a plaintiff’s injuries, without more. Accordingly, Z.S.’s injuries cannot be said to have arisen from the operation of the school bus. The bus merely provided the location for the assaults. Aldine ISD is therefore entitled to governmental immunity as to Monroe’s gross negligence claim,” Ellison said.
Aldine ISD’s Superintendent, Dr. LaTonya M. Goffney, was also immune from liability, according to Ellison.
“Defendant Goffney argues that the gross negligence claims against her should be dismissed pursuant to the Texas Tort Claim Act’s election-of-remedies statute. That statute applies to all unintentional torts, including negligence. Section 101.106(e) of the ‘Election of Remedies’ section of the statute provides, ‘If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.’ The effect of the election-of-remedies statute is that it ‘forces a plaintiff to decide at the outset whether an employee acted independently…or acted within the general scope of his or her employment,” Ellison stated.
“In this case, provision Section 101.106(e) plainly requires dismissal of the gross negligence claims against Superintendent Goffney. Because the Act also declines to waive Aldine ISD’s governmental immunity, the Act’s procedural devices serve to strip away the Court’s ability to reach the merits of Monroe’s negligence claims. This result is distressing in light of such devastating harm to a young child. But the Court’s hands are tied – Texas courts have repeatedly acknowledged that the Act has this effect where governmental immunity is not waived. Texas courts have not yet identified a pathway around Section 101.106(e)’s unforgiving procedural bar. The Court must dismiss Monroe’s gross negligence claims against Superintendent Goffney.”
As for Monroe’s Title IX claims, Ellison likewise concurred with the defense and found they were ripe for dismissal, since they “failed to adequately plead that school officials were deliberately indifferent to the sexual assault, as Title IX requires.”
“Parents cannot establish standing to pursue personal Title IX based on their children’s injuries, but they can establish standing to assert the claims of their children as ‘next friends.’ Monroe cites to Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District to argue that she has standing to assert a personal claim. However, Winkelman is about parents’ rights to bring personal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act claims, not Title IX claims. Accordingly, Winkelman has no bearing on this suit. Monroe’s personal Title IX claim against defendants may not proceed,” Ellison said.
“Next, defendants argue that Monroe has not stated a viable Title IX claim on behalf of Z.S.. To state a Title IX claim for student-on-student harassment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) a school official with authority to address the harassment; (2) had actual notice of the harassment (or risk of harassment); and (3) was deliberately indifferent to such knowledge. To the extent that Monroe bases her Title IX claim on Aldine ISD’s actions prior to Feb. 1, 2023, her claim fails because she has not alleged that Aldine ISD had actual notice of any sexual abuse on buses prior to that date. To the extent that Monroe bases her Title IX claim on Aldine ISD’s actions following Feb. 1, 2023, her allegations do not demonstrate that Aldine ISD acted with deliberate indifference. She alleges, without elaboration, that Aldine ISD began an investigation after learning of the assaults. These allegations do not show that Aldine ISD ‘responded to known peer harassment’ in a ‘clearly unreasonable’ manner. Therefore, at this stage, Monroe’s allegations cannot plausibly support a Title IX claim. That said, the Court is not convinced that amendment would be futile. If Monroe wishes to amend her complaint, she should take care to allege facts that show that Aldine ISD had actual notice of Z.S.’s abuse before Feb. 1, 2023; and/or that Aldine ISD’s response following its actual notice on Feb. 1, 2023, amounts to deliberate indifference.”
Ellison further found that the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims under Monell and the request for punitive damages, were also dismissed.
“For the forgoing reasons, the Court grants defendant’s motion. Except where otherwise noted, plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within two weeks of the filing of this order. Defendant may file a motion to dismiss within two weeks of plaintiff’s filing of her amended complaint,” Ellison stated.
The plaintiff is represented by B’Ivory LaMarr of The LaMarr Firm in Houston, plus Sheridan Todd Yeary of The Yeary Firm, in Baltimore, Md.
The defendant is represented by Alexa Taylor Gould and Christopher B. Gilbert of Thompson & Horton, also in Houston.
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas case 4:24-cv-00139
From the Southeast Texas Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com